Introduction Introduction
There is widespread belief among regulators and policy analysts that deregulation of the electricity generating industry will yield economies in the cost of power supply, relative to the previously regulated regime, as a result of the introduction of competition. While competition in electric markets promises to improve efficiency, there are well recognized aspects of market behavior, especially in industries with a relatively small number of firms, that threaten to offset the benefits that would lower electricity prices. In particular, in the normal operation of markets, price can be well above the marginal cost of production as a result of pricing strategies adopted by rational firms. As competitive generation markets emerge across the U.S. in the next few years, it is important to have as much information and clarity as possible about these pricing effects, so that they can be mitigated before they manifest themselves to the detriment of consumers.
The poolco is one of the market structures that will be used to dispatch and sell electricity in the deregulated generation industry. California's competitive market is scheduled to commence operation on January 1, 1998, through a poolco-type Power Exchange. Elsewhere in the U.S., the states in the Pennsylvania-New Jersey-Maryland (PJM) power pool, the New England Power Pool (NEPOOL), and the New York Power Pool (NYPP), have also established plans for the introduction of region-wide poolcos to facilitate wholesale competition in the generation market.
In this paper, we present an analysis that estimates the price of electricity dispatched and sold through a poolco on the basis of bids made by rational, profit-maximizing generating firms. Our results are calculated from a closed-form mathematical formula that provides the instantaneous market clearing price of electricity when generating firms adopt bidding strategies constructed from the Nash Equilibrium. This formula is derived from the analytical concept of the supply function equilibrium (SFE), originally 1 The Nash Equilibrium provides a bidding strategy that, if adopted by each generating firm, results in independent profit maximization. If all firms bid in accordance with the Nash Equilibrium strategy, and one firm deviates from this strategy, then the instantaneous profit of this firm cannot increase.
developed by Klemperer and Meyer (1989) and subsequently applied by Green and Newbery (1992) in their model of the electricity spot market of England and Wales.
In our analysis, we compare the market clearing prices resulting from Nash Equilibriumbased bidding to a benchmark given by the "perfectly competitive" price of electricity in a poolco. The "perfectly competitive" price of electricity in a poolco can be thought of as the market clearing price when all firms bid the production costs (or short-run marginal costs) of their generating units. The frequency and magnitude of the elevated electricity prices that result from Nash-Equilibrium-based bidding can be construed as evidence of market power in a poolco, which results from tacit collusion among generating firms.
We have applied our poolco pricing model to electricity supply and demand data for Pennsylvania. We have quantified the average price mark-up, relative to the "perfectly competitive" price, that would result from Nash Equilibrium-based bidding strategies over the course of one year as a function of the number of identical firms in the poolco market. We have found that the Nash Equilibrium-based prices are sensitive to such factors as the average reliability of generating units, the amount of reserve capacity in the system, and the precision with which generating firms are able to predict demand for electricity on a daily basis. We present the results of such sensitivity analyses in this paper.
Our results show that, as one would expect, the market clearing price of electricity decreases as the number of generating firms bidding into the poolco increases. However, even with a relatively low market concentration (high number of competing firms), the market clearing prices are still significantly higher than "perfectly competitive" prices. Our findings have important implications for the design and operation of future electricity markets. Moreover, our findings suggest that the guidelines used by the Department of Justice 2 and the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission 3 to characterize market power in electricity markets may require revision if they are to prevent the exercise of market power in poolco-type markets.
The Poolco The Poolco
The poolco model for dispatching and selling electricity is simple and well documented (Garber et al, 1994; Budhraja and Woolf, 1994) . The important points to note about poolcos are the bid-based dispatch of generating units, and the payment rule whereby all units dispatched in each time interval receive the market clearing price, which is set by the bid price of the marginal unit required to meet demand in each time interval. Thus, regardless of their production costs, or even their bid prices, infra-marginal units dispatched in each time interval all receive the market clearing price. Some poolco proponents believe that competition in the generation industry will force firms to base their bids on the variable production costs of their generating units. 4 In fact, if all units bid their variable production costs, the resulting market clearing price of electricity assumes its "perfectly competitive" value, given by the short-run marginal cost of electricity generation.
5 In our analysis, we refer to this bidding practice as production cost bidding. However, if the downward competitive pressure on price in a poolco is insufficient to bring about production cost bidding, generating firms can employ opportunistic bidding strategies that result in stable market clearing prices significantly above the short-run marginal cost of generation.
Market Power and Market Concentration Market Power and Market Concentration
In this section, we briefly define the concepts of market power and market concentration, as well as the numerical indicators that we use to quantify them in our analysis. Market power can generally be defined as the ability of a particular seller, or group of sellers, to influence the prices of a product to their advantage over a sustained period of time. We use the Price-Cost Margin Index (PCMI) to measure the extent of market power abuse in a poolco. The PCMI quantifies the degree to which the price of a product in a market deviates from what would be its "perfectly competitive" price. The PCMI is a retrospective indicator of market power, defined as: PCMI = Actual Product Price -"Perfectly Competitive" Product Price * 100% "Perfectly Competitive" Product Price where the "perfectly competitive" price is equal to the marginal cost of electricity generation.
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The Department of Justice (DOJ) merger guidelines state that a market can be considered competitive if prices do not exceed their "perfectly competitive" level by more than 5%. 7 This statement can be rephrased in terms of the PCMI --if the PCMI is above 5%, then according to DOJ guidelines, a market cannot be characterized as competitive. See, for example, analyses conducted by Hieronymus (1997) , and affidavit submitted by Felder and Peterson (1997) .
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In a theoretical model of a poolco, owners of generating units are assumed to bid their variable production costs in each time interval. They recover their fixed costs through a margin earned in each time interval that they are dispatched, given by the difference between their variable production cost and the market clearing price. It should, however, be noted that peaking units, and possibly cycling units, which run in fewer hours of the year than baseload units, would in reality need to bid above their production costs in order to have ample opportunity to recover their fixed costs. Thus, generating units higher up the system-wide supply curve may adopt bidding strategies that more closely reflect their long-run marginal costs of production.
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The PCMI has a minimum value of zero -implying a perfectly competitive market --and an unbounded maximum value. A PCMI value of 100%, for example, means that the price of a product is twice the price that would be expected if the market were perfectly competitive. The PCMI is similar to the well known Lerner Index, in which the price margin is divided by the actual price, as opposed to the "perfectly competitive" price in the PCMI. The PCMI and Lerner Index are connected in the following way: Lerner Index = PCMI/(1+PCMI). In our analysis, we use the Market concentration is a measure of the number of firms in a given market. The degree to which market power can be exercised in a given market is largely a function of market concentration, however, it also depends upon the structure of the market, the nature of the particular product being sold in this market 9 , the ease of market entry for new firms, and the price elasticity of demand for the product. We discuss market concentration and market structure later in this paper, and also address ease of market entry and price elasticity of demand.
In our analysis, we quantify market concentration using the Herfindahl-Hirschmann Index (HHI), which is defined as:
where S i is the share of each firm in the market. 10 It should be noted that the reciprocal of the HHI (10,000 divided by HHI) yields a number that can be interpreted as the effective number of identically-sized firms in the market.
The HHI is a simple indicator of market concentration, whose effectiveness has not been demonstrated either theoretically or empirically in the context of the electric industry. However, the HHI has recently been adopted by the FERC as a proxy for market power in evaluating proposed mergers between firms in the same market, as well as transitions to market-based pricing in power pools. In using the HHI, the FERC adopted the DOJ/FTC guidelines, which state that a market is "unconcentrated" if its HHI is less than 1,000; "moderately concentrated" if its HHI lies between 1,000 and 1,800; and "highly concentrated" if its HHI is greater than 1,800. For purposes of reference, a market with ten identically-sized firms has an HHI of 1,000, while a market with five identically-sized firms has an HHI of 2,000.
In some models of economic competition, the PCMI (or Lerner Index) and HHI are directly connected by a simple formula (Krouse, 1990) . However, such models are too simple to capture pricing behavior in poolcos. As demonstrated later in this paper, the HHI thresholds outlined above may not be applicable to electricity dispatched and sold PCMI rather than the Lerner Index, since it has the "perfectly competitive" price in its denominator, and thus facilitates comparison across various scenarios that may have different prices.
9
Electricity is in many ways a very unique product. It has at least four properties that make it markedly different from products manufactured and sold in other markets: i) it cannot be stored in large quantities in most electric systems; ii) it cannot be readily substituted, especially in the short term; iii) it can only be transported along existing transmission lines (new transmission lines require long periods of time and are expensive to erect); and iv) generating units (especially peaking capacity) are capital intensive, which increases the risk for new market entrants in a competitive market. The implications of these properties are that it may be relatively easier for generators of electricity to exercise market power than for manufacturers of other products sold in competitive markets.
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If the market share of each firm is expressed in percentage terms, the HHI lies between 0 and 10,000. The maximum value of the HHI occurs when there is one firm only in a given industry, with a (monopolistic) 100% market share. The minimum value of the HHI occurs in the limit that the industry comprises a very large number of firms with negligible market shares. in poolco markets. Before describing our analytical methodology and presenting our results, we briefly discuss the mechanisms by which market power can be exercised in a poolco.
How Can Market Power Be Exercised in a Poolco? How Can Market Power Be Exercised in a Poolco?
In a poolco, there is an incentive for generating firms to increase the market clearing price, since it is paid to all infra-marginal units in each time interval. There are two principal mechanisms by which firms may exercise market power in a poolco. The first mechanism involves firms bidding prices above the production costs of their generating units, with the intent of forcing up the market clearing price. In a poolco, the benefit of "bidding up" the market clearing price typically outweighs the risk of being undercut by a competitor for firms owning a substantial amount of infra-marginal capacity.
This first mechanism is facilitated by the fact that the bids submitted by generating firms apply to the next twelve, or twenty-four, hour period. Since the demand for electricity fluctuates over any 12-or 24-hour period, firms can anticipate these changes in demand in their construction of a bidding schedule for this period. It appears possible for generating firms to construct bidding schedules so that electricity prices exceed the short-run marginal costs of generation in almost every hour of each day, as discussed later in this paper.
The second mechanism for exercising market power in a poolco involves firms withholding some of their capacity in the bidding process, in an effort to cause more expensive units higher up the system-wide supply curve to set the market clearing price. As is the case with the first mechanism, capacity withholding strives to increase the market clearing price. Firms that attempt this strategy must ensure that the foregone revenues from not having some of their infra-marginal capacity dispatched are more than offset by the additional revenues paid to their capacity that is dispatched, in each time interval. Our analysis does not consider capacity withholding, since it is not as potentially profitable to firms as simply "bidding-up" the price, in which case no capacity has to be withheld. Two market power studies have, however, shown the effectiveness of capacity withholding. Newbery (1995) has shown that capacity withholding may be profitable to firms whose market shares range between 10% and 40%, while Wolak and Patrick (1997) have shown empirically that this mechanism has been effective in exercising market power in the electricity spot market of England and Wales.
The "Game of Poolco" The "Game of Poolco"
In our analysis, we model a poolco as an (n+1)-player, non-cooperative game of
• n identical profit-maximizing generating firms, each offering bids for capacity in the form of a supply curve (or supply function) 11 , and • one poolco operator responsible for ordering the bids and dispatching units so as to meet the demand at least-cost in each time interval.
We use the analytical concept of the supply function equilibrium (SFE), originally developed by Klemperer and Meyer (1989) and subsequently applied by Green and Newbery (1992) in their model of the electricity spot market of England and Wales.
In accordance with the rules of the game for the n firms and poolco operator, we calculated analytically the bidding strategy that, if adopted by all firms, would satisfy the condition of independent profit maximization by each firm. This bidding strategy is given mathematically by the Nash Equilibrium, such that if one firm bids a supply curve that deviates from this strategy, while all other firms bid supply curves that adhere to this strategy, then the profit of the one firm departing from this strategy cannot increase. In this game with n identical firms, all firms employ a symmetrical Nash Equilibriumbased strategy (identical for all firms).
In deriving our formula for the market clearing price of electricity, we advanced the Klemperer-Meyer theory by relaxing the convexity and differentiability conditions, which consequently allows for "real world", step-wise supply curves to be studied. 12 We have incorporated this formula, which appears below in Figure 1 , into a poolco pricing model for the special case in which:
• the generating firms are identical in size and have identical supply curves;
• there is zero price elasticity of demand;
• generating firms have perfect information about one another's production cost curves;
• generating firms have equal accuracy in predicting demand.
11
The supply curve indicates how much generation the firms are willing to sell at different unit prices.
12
The derivation of this formula appears in the Appendix. 
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where -instantaneous market -clearing price of electricity in a given time interval.
-instantaneous demand in a given time interval;
-the dispatch order number of the generating unit that is on the margin in that time interval.
-number of identical firms.
-variable cost of the marginal unit given demand level of -the dispatch order number and variable cost of those generating units that are above the margin in that time interval but that are expected to be on or below the margin in some other time interval during the 24 -hour period.
-the dispatch order number of the most expensive unit expected to run during the 24 -hour period.
-total capacity of all generating units with dispatch order not exceeding
It is important to note that in the above formula is always less than
Subject to these assumptions, the formula for the market clearing price of electricity resulting from Nash Equilibrium-based bidding strategies is a function of:
• the particular electric system's production cost curve (i.e., the size of the steps of capacity, and the increases in variable cost between these steps); • the instantaneous demand for electricity;
• the maximum anticipated demand in the overall period for which bids are submitted;
• the number of identical generating firms bidding into the poolco.
The formula shows that as n increases, the market clearing price decreases and moves towards the "perfectly competitive" market clearing price that would result from production cost bidding. It can also be inferred from the formula that the production costs of generating units that are included in the supply curve but are not dispatched in a particular time interval can have significant influence on the market clearing price of electricity in that time interval. 13 Although the concept of the Nash Equilibrium is widely used in economic theory to model the behavior of firms in competitive markets, it is important to emphasize two reasons why it is in the best interests of profit-maximizing firms to adopt a Nash Equilibrium-based strategy in a poolco. 13 The magnitudes of the contributions to the market clearing price from such units not dispatched vary from hour to hour, and from day to day.
Reason 1.
By definition of the Nash Equilibrium, it is rewarding for a firm to bid according to the Nash Equilibrium strategy when competing firms also bid according to the Nash Equilibrium strategy.
Reason 2. The Nash Equilibrium strategy is stable: the firm that decides to deviate from this strategy has a strong incentive to return to it.
Both of these statements are illustrated by Figure 2 , which shows the potential profits of two identical firms competing with one another.
14 In this figure, each curve represents the instantaneous (hourly) profits of one firm as a function of the instantaneous system demand for electricity. The highest curve, labeled {Nash/Nash}, represents the profit of each firm when both bid according to the Nash Equilibrium strategy. The lowest curve, labeled {PCB/PCB}, represents the profit when both firms use a production cost bidding strategy.
The two curves that lie in the middle, labeled {PCB/Nash} and {Nash/PCB}, represent the firms' profits when their bidding strategies are not identical --one applies the Nash Equilibrium strategy while the other adopts a production cost bidding strategy. In this case, the higher of the two curves shows the profit of the firm that applies the production cost bidding strategy, while the lower curve shows the profit of the firm that adheres to the Nash Equilibrium strategy.
The figure shows that if one firm is applying the production cost bidding strategy, then the other firm that adheres to the Nash Equilibrium strategy has no incentive to switch to the production cost bidding strategy. Similarly, if one firm is bidding in accordance with the Nash Equilibrium, then the other firm that deviates from the Nash Equilibrium strategy can increase its profits by returning to the Nash Equilibrium strategy.
14
In Figure 2 , we use the production cost curve for Pennsylvania, which we discuss later in this paper.
Figure 2

Data and Modeling Assumptions Data and Modeling Assumptions
We applied our poolco pricing model to actual 1995 data for the Pennsylvania electric system. The Pennsylvania production cost curve is representative of many electric systems around the U.S., in that it contains different types of generating units --nuclear, coal steam, oil steam, and oil and gas combustion turbines --which have their own specific cost and operating characteristics. 15 We apportioned each step of capacity on the production cost curve, corresponding to one generating unit with a certain capacity and variable cost, equally among n firms, so that the firms each own 1/n of each step of capacity, and thus have identical market shares and production cost curves. Each firm's production cost curve is consequently a curve identical in shape to the Pennsylvania electric system production cost curve, but n times smaller in capacity (or n times smaller along the abscissa.)
The premium earned by firms through the difference between the market clearing price and the price that would result from production cost bidding (as quantified in the PCMI numerator) varies depending upon the level of demand. We calculated how this premium would vary over the course of a typical year, and then averaged over these premiums in order to obtain an annual PCMI. We constructed empirical demand data by dividing the 1995 PJM load duration curve (LDC) 16 into ten load segments, each of which represents 15 The data was taken from Exhibit__(RJF-2) in testimony submitted by Randall J. Falkenberg to the Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission, Docket No. I-940032, November 1995. 16 This data was obtained from the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission's Electric Power Directory, an on-line service. different load data from days scattered through the year. Each load segment is characterized by a peak daily load and the intra-day variation in load. We estimated the anticipated peak load and intra-day load distribution for each of the ten load segments by averaging over similar types of days in the LDC. The load segments are shown in the following The load segments contain data from different numbers of days. The load segments corresponding to days with higher peak loads contain data from fewer days. This approach was taken in order to better approximate the shape of the PJM LDC.
2)
The data in the last three columns of the table are expressed as a fraction of the annual peak load.
We also made the following two assumptions in our analysis, regarding capacity outages and load uncertainty:
• In any hour of the year, some portion of the system's capacity is unavailable 17 , as a result of scheduled or unscheduled outages. We modeled different levels of capacity non-availability, ranging from 10% to 19%.
• In order to ensure sufficient capacity to meet load in each hour, the firms bid a total capacity in their supply curves equal to the forecast peak load over the next 24-hour period scaled up by an "adjustment factor" X. We modeled values of X ranging from 0.25% to 6%. 17 We assume that the unavailable capacity is uniformly distributed along the system's production cost curve.
Reference Case and Sensitivity Analysis
In our analysis, we calculated the PCMI for each of the ten daily load segments, as defined above in Table 1 , as well as the annual PCMI, which is the weighted average for these ten load segments. We analyzed the resulting PCMI values as a function of three parameters: i) the number of identical firms; ii) the level of capacity non-availability; and iii) the accuracy of the firms' demand forecasts. Table 2 below summarizes our reference case and shows the numerical range of these three parameters that were analyzed as sensitivities. In order to gauge the impact of each parameter on the PCMI, we varied the parameter over its range while maintaining the two remaining parameters at their reference case values. In the following section of this paper, we discuss how each of these parameters influences the PCMI. The PCMI is most sensitive, as one might expect, to the number of identical generating firms in the market. Figure 3 shows how the computed market clearing price varies as a function of instantaneous demand for different numbers of identical firms. 19 The figure shows that for all levels of demand with n=2, the market clearing price is significantly higher than the "perfectly competitive" poolco price that would result from production cost bidding. As n increases, the market clearing price decreases and converges towards the "perfectly competitive" market clearing price defined by the production cost curve. However, as can be seen from the figure, the level of convergence is not uniform across all levels of demand. During hours of relatively low demand, the market clearing price is closer to the "perfectly competitive" price. However, the PCMI is significant during hours of high demand, even with a large number of firms bidding into the poolco.
18
A system reserve margin of 20% was used for all calculations. 19 We should point out that in Figure 3 , we have assumed that peak load is equal to total system capacity, purely for illustrative purposes. On days with lower peak demands, the deviation between the market clearing price and the "perfectly competitive" price would be lower.
Figure 3
Figure 4 shows how the PCMI varies as a function of n (the number of firms) for the ten load segments representing the different types of day in the load duration curve. In this figure, the load segments are defined by the ratio of their anticipated peak daily load to the annual peak daily load. Figure 4 shows that the daily PCMI decreases as the number of firms, n, increases, and as the peak daily load decreases for a given n. The figure also illustrates the sizable differences between daily PCMI values for days with different peak loads. This indicates that the ability for generating firms to exercise market power varies substantially with the level of peak demand from one day to the next. In fact, in the case of five identical firms, the PCMI only exceeds 5% in 150 days of the year, while in the case of ten identical firms, the PCMI exceeds 5% in 80 days. Thus, when there are more firms in the market, the level of peak demand necessary to exercise market power increases. This, in turn, means that as the number of rims in the market increases, the opportunities for exercising market power are concentrated over fewer days of the year. The line running from the top-right to the bottom-left of the figure shows how the annual PCMI varies with n. The abscissa shows the HHI value that corresponds to each value of n (for example, an HHI of 2,000 denotes n=5.) The abscissa is also divided into three areas --HHI values less than 1,000; HHI values between 1,000 and 1,800; and HHI values greater than 1,800 --which correspond to the three levels of market concentration appearing in the DOJ and FERC merger guidelines. The horizontal line at the bottom of the figure, drawn at a PCMI of 5%, corresponds to the value of the PCMI for which the DOJ believes there is an absence of market power.
Figure 4
Market Clearing Price as a Function of Number of Equal Firms vs. Production Cost Curve
20
The annual PCMI gives the percentage by which the annual revenues of all generating firms in the poolco exceed the annual revenues that would accrue from production cost bidding. These results show that even though the annual PCMI decreases as the number of identical generating firms bidding into the poolco increases, the price mark-ups using Pennsylvania data are significant even at relatively low values of the HHI. We find that the average price mark-up over the course of one year is 16% in a market with five identical firms, and 11% for ten identical firms. For purposes of reference, the DOJ and FERC guidelines state that a market with more than ten identical firms is "unconcentrated." In addition, we find that in order to reduce the annual PCMI to 5%, the poolco would require almost thirty identical firms. This result contrasts dramatically with observations made in the economic literature that a poolco market with four or five firms would be workably competitive (Joskow, 1995.) Figure 6 shows the annual PCMI as a function of capacity non-availability in a poolco. The levels of capacity non-availability should be gauged with reference to our assumed system reserve margin of 20%. Figure 6 shows that the PCMI increases from approximately 9% to 22% as the level of unavailable capacity increases from 10% to 19%. 21 In other words, each additional percent of capacity that is not available, as a result of scheduled or unscheduled outages, results on average in a 1.5% increase in market clearing prices relative to the "perfectly competitive" price. This result can be explained by the fact that when more capacity is unavailable, the production cost curve becomes steeper. Consequently, units with higher production costs are required to meet demand in more hours, leading to higher average market clearing prices. It should be noted that even when the capacity non-availability is at the maximum value of 19% in the range considered, there is still excess capacity in the system. Thus, the marginal unit required to meet demand in each hour is never the last unit on the system's production cost curve.
Annual PCMI as a Function of Capacity Non-Availability in a Poolco
(5 Equal Firms, Forecast Precision 3%) Figure 7 plots the annual PCMI as a function of the demand forecast accuracy in the twenty-four hour period for which firms must bid ahead of time. The PCMI increases from approximately 12% to 23% as the demand forecast error increases from 0.3% to 6%. In other words, each additional percent error in the demand forecast results in a roughly 2% increase in market clearing price relative to the "perfectly competitive" price. This result can be explained by the fact that when the forecast error is higher, the supply schedule submitted by firms for the next twenty-four hour period includes units higher up the production cost curve to account for this additional demand. As shown by Figure 1 , the inclusion of these additional higher-cost units in the supply schedule serves to increase the instantaneous market clearing price.
Figure 7
Comparison with Other Market Power Studies
Our numerical results are comparable to those obtained by Green and Newbery in 1992 , and by Andersson and Bergman in 1995. Green and Newbery found price mark-ups for a poolco with five identical firms of 17% using 1988/89 data, and 23% using forecast data for 1994. Andersson and Bergman reported price mark-ups of approximately 19% for a poolco with six identical firms. In comparison, our reference case for five identical firms in a poolco results in a price mark-up of 16%.
Although our results are similar to those obtained in the aforementioned two studies, we believe it important to carefully compare the key assumptions made in each study, in order to determine whether the results should indeed be comparable. Table 3 outlines the key assumptions made in our analysis and in the two aforementioned market power studies. As can be seen from the table, Andersson and Bergman adopted an analytical technique different from that employed by Green and Newbery, and from that employed in our analysis. However, there are two elements that render the Green and Newbery analysis different from our analysis: i) the choice of Supply Function Equilibrium (SFE), and ii) the assumption about the price elasticity of demand.
The Choice of SFE
As Klemperer and Meyer show, a supply function satisfying the definition of a Nash Equilibrium is generally not unique. There is a connected set of such supply functions, bounded by a Low SFE and a High SFE. 22 The Low SFE on a given day intersects the production cost curve at the point of maximum anticipated demand for that day, as shown in Figure 3 . The High SFE, on the other hand, is a supply schedule based upon the assumption that each firm behaves as a monopolist in the particular hour in which maximum demand is anticipated. All solutions to the Klemperer-Meyer equation lying between the High SFE and the Low SFE constitute Nash Equilibria. The spread between the High SFE and the Low SFE can be considerable, as shown by Green and Newbery in their 1992 paper.
Green and Newbery suggested in their 1992 paper that the High SFE should be used in modeling poolco markets. They justified this assumption by stating that all firms would maximize their profits by adopting this bidding strategy. This statement, while absolutely 22 Mathematically, Klemperer-Meyer's supply function equilibrium satisfies a first order differential equation for quantity as a function of price. To obtain a unique solution of this equation, one has to apply an appropriate boundary condition. correct, does not justify the fact that firms would necessarily choose the High SFE over any other valid Nash Equilibrium in constructing their bid prices. On the contrary, we believe that the use of the High SFE is the least likely bidding strategy that would be adopted by each firm. We explain this observation by considering the following illustrative example in which two competing firms can select one of two possible SFE strategies --the High SFE or the Low SFE. The possible outcomes from each combination of choices made by the two firms are shown in Table 4 . The outcomes for the first firm are shaded, while those for the second firm are left unshaded. While the two strategies that can be adopted (High SFE or Low SFE) both represent Nash Equilibria, it is always more profitable for one firm to employ the same strategy as that of its rival. In addition, it is more risky for each firm to adopt the High SFE strategy, especially if the other firm opts for the Low SFE strategy. In this case, the firm bidding in accordance with the High SFE would fare less well than if it had opted for the Low SFE. This table thus illustrates that the High SFE strategy is the riskier of the two bidding strategies for each firm. It is for this reason that we assumed in our analysis that each firm would bid according to the Low SFE in the range.
It is, however, conceivable that over time in a repeated game, firms might employ what is called a "tit-for-tat" pricing strategy, by gradually raising their bid prices from the Low SFE towards the High SFE. As a result, their actual bids would float somewhere between these two limits, and this "tit-for-tat" pricing strategy would result in higher average market prices than those expected with the Low SFE. Consequently, to the extent that firms' profit-maximizing bids lie somewhere between the Low SFE and the High SFE, our analysis understates the extent of market power in the poolco. It is also worth noting that Wolfram's empirical study of market power in the England and Wales electricity spot market concludes that "... the high average pool prices in Green and Newbery's (1992) simulations have not been realized." (Wolfram, 1995, p. 25) . However, consistent with Green and Newbery, Wolfram made her comparison using the High SFE in the range. Although we were unable to perform a detailed statistical analysis of the data used by Wolfram, it is clear that the fit between actual prices and those resulting from the SFE-based model would have been better had Wolfram used the Low SFE rather than the High SFE.
Price Elasticity of Demand
The analytical technique adopted in our study is simplified significantly by assuming zero price elasticity of demand. Newbery and Green, on the other hand, incorporated a nonzero price elasticity of demand into their study by assuming that instantaneous demand for electricity is a declining linear function of price in every hour.
A recent study by Patrick and Wolak (1997) has revealed the significance of price elasticity (and cross-elasticity) of demand in countering the exercise of market power in bid-based power pools. This study revealed many complicated ways in which consumers might respond to volatile electricity prices. A proper model of electricity consumers' behavior should, in fact, be at least as detailed as models of electricity producers' behavior.
Our assumption of zero price elasticity of demand would tend to overstate the extent of market power abuse in a poolco, since consumers, especially industrial firms with curtailable loads, would have some ability to respond to high market prices. However, our initial explorations of non-zero elasticities of in a Nash Equilibrium framework indicate that the market power observed in our analysis could only be offset by very significant price elasticities of demand, somewhere in the region of -1.0.
Qualifications Regarding this Analysis
The effectiveness with which market power may be exercised by generating firms in actual deregulated markets will depend upon several interrelated factors. These include, but are not limited to, the type of market structure that emerges under deregulation (i.e., poolco markets, bilateral markets, or some hybrid of the two), the particular electric system's generation profile, the annual load profile, the ability of consumers to respond to increases in electricity prices, the intra-regional and inter-regional transmission network, the ease with which generating firms can compete in other regional markets, and the ease of entry for new generation.
Our analysis quantifies the magnitude of the price mark-ups resulting from profitmaximizing bidding strategies adopted by firms in a representative poolco market (using Pennsylvania supply and demand data), in the special case with identical firms and zero elasticity of demand. The factors most likely to influence our reported findings are the threat of entry into the poolco market, and the extent to which bilateral markets overlaid on the poolco market may help market entrants and mitigate against price volatility.
These two factors have been addressed by Newbery (1996) in a theoretical analysis of the impact of market entry and contracts on poolco prices. Newbery finds that the threat of market entry can reduce market power abuse in a poolco, and that market entry is facilitated in markets that are tight in capacity, provided new entrants compete in the price-setting part of the supply curve. While we recognize the importance of market entry and contracts in determining poolco prices, we do not explicitly address these two factors in our analysis, primarily because they cannot easily be modeled theoretically and applied to accurate empirical data.
In addition, market entry would not likely be a threat given the assumptions and the nature of the electric system modeled in our analysis. The Pennsylvania electric system that we modeled is not capacity-limited; we assume a 20% reserve margin (which in turn reduces the extent of market abuse relative to a situation with less excess capacity.) Thus, it is likely that new market entrants in this system would eventually be gas-fired combustion turbines, required to provide peaking capacity to meet load growth over time. Gas-fired combined cycle units, which tend to operate in baseload and cycling duty cycles, would not likely be able to compete in this poolco market in the short term. This is primarily because the system is overly baseloaded, and thus because of new gasfired combined cycle units' relatively high variable production costs, it is doubtful whether such units could displace sufficient incumbent generation from the dispatch order (even in a profit-maximizing bidding scenario) to recover sufficient fixed costs and a return on investment.
Conclusions Conclusions
The analysis presented in this paper provides a first step in characterizing and quantifying electricity pricing behavior by profit-maximizing firms in a pure poolco market with identical firms. Our principal findings are that generating firms can exercise market power in such markets by adopting mutually profit-maximizing, stable bidding strategies, consistent with the Nash Equilibrium, that lead to average prices considerably higher than those expected from production cost bidding.
Our findings have strong policy implications for the deregulation of electricity markets across the U.S., and suggest that current DOJ and FERC guidelines may not be adequate in countering the exercise of market power in bid-based power pools. The analysis of market power in poolco markets should, to the extent possible, be extended to include simulation modeling of the various bidding strategies that could be adopted by generating firms to influence market clearing prices.
Fortunately, there are several market power mitigation options available to electricity regulators and legislators. The divestiture of generation assets, to form a generation market with a larger number of smaller-sized firms (i.e., with a larger effective n), would help to constrain the instantaneous market clearing prices from a poolco that result from profit-maximizing bidding strategies. It is important that divestiture be carried out sensibly, by ensuring that divested units not all be sold to the same firm or be purchased by firms with large market shares, and that particular attention be paid to units of potentially strategic importance in exercising market power. Other options for mitigating market power include changing the bidding rules and payment rules in a poolco, imposing price caps in hours when market power abuse may be problematic, regulating must-run units and units located in load pockets, promoting real-time metering on the consumer side, and promoting contracts to mitigate against volatile and systematically raised prices.
The analysis presented in this paper should be refined, and if possible, generalized to more realistic scenarios with i) firms that have different market shares, as well as different distributions of generating units in their production cost curves; ii) non-zero price elasticities of demand; iii) imperfect information about other firms' supply curves and bids; iv) transmission constraints; and v) different payment rules (i.e., payment price for dispatched units equals each one's bid price). It is also important to study electricity pricing in other proposed models for deregulated generation markets, including purely bilateral markets, as well as hybrids of bilateral and poolco markets, as have been implemented in the England and Wales spot market, and in the Alberta Power Pool. Assuming that (taking the lowest SFE), we get
Formula (2) gives a general solution of equation (1) where Q* is a peak hour demand in a day.
Consider now a step-wise function z(x): 
Proving that a Solution (3) of a Klemperer-Meyer Equation Represents a Nash Equilibrium in the Game of Poolco
We consider a one-shot game played during a one day period. We assume that m generating units running at full capacity on that day would be sufficient to meet peak demand on that day, $ D . In other words, $ D X m ≤ .
Let P*(Q) be a solution of equation (1) given by formula (3). As one can see, P*(Q) is a continuous, monotonically ascending and piece-wise differentiable function of Q identified for all values of Q such that 0 ≤ ≤ Q X m .
A supply function of each symmetrical firm is equal to q*(p) which is an inverse function to P*(nQ). In other words, 
where C(q) is a production cost function of each firm.
If all firms use the same supply function, q*(p), they should earn the same instantaneous profit equal to
Let us now assume that all firms, except firm number j, adhere to the same strategy --to bid supply function q*(p). However, the firm number j, applies a different supply strategy, v(p). 
Proof
If all n firms use the same strategy, q*, then q*(P*(D))=D/n for any level of demand D not exceeding the peak level. However, if firm number j applies a different strategy, v, two possibilities arise:
1. Firms will serve equal portions of the total demand D, D/n, while market clearing price at that demand level equals p'; p' may deviate from P*(D).
2.
All firms, except firm number j will serve equal loads because they apply identical strategies, however, load served by firm number j will be different. The market clearing price in that case may also deviate from P*(D)
Consider the first possibility. Although one firm applies strategy v, instead of q*, loads served by each firm are the same as if they all applied strategy q*. Therefore, costs of all firms would be the same as if they all applied strategy q*. As a result, the only factor which may change the profit of firm j is the market clearing price. By definition, the market clearing price p' is the lowest price at which system demand could be met given supply functions of all firms. In order for the market clearing price p' to increase above the level of P*(D) the latter must not allow the dispatcher to meet the demand level D. In other words, 
Therefore, the profit of firm number j will be equal to Let us show now that the profit of firm j as a function of x reaches its global maximum at x = D/n. That, in fact, means that the profit reaches its maximum at v = q* and proves the lemma.
We will show this in three steps:
1.
Show Obviously, these three conditions guarantee that x = D/n is a global maximum of the profit function of firm j.
Step 1. This follows simply from the definition of the market clearing price function P* and cost function C.
Step 2. Differentiating formula (8) The identity in the above sequence of equations is a direct result of the KlempererMeyer equation (1) which function P*(D) must satisfy by definition.
Step 3.
Let y n n D x = − − 1 ( ) ; substituting y into (9) and remembering that ′ = C x z nx ( ) ( ) 
